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Scaling the Corporate Ladder: Do Women Really Have a Fair Chance To Advance in
Corporate America? The Glass Ceiling and Proposed Title VII Solutions to Unconscious
Discrimination.
Michelle Alfonso

Introduction:
Marissa Mayer, President and CEO of Yahoo Inc.,1 became a proud parent of a baby boy
in late September of 2012.2 Mayer took control of the board at Yahoo during her third trimester
with every step of her pregnancy scrutinized by the media.3 This news, if heard merely 30 years
ago would have probably shocked women around America. Yet, in modern society this news
symbolizes a major success for women from a long uphill struggle. Mayer has accomplished
what some women wouldn’t dare to dream even with the contemporary notions of equal
opportunity for men and women. Mayer’s extraordinary story begs the question whether more
stories like hers will come into fruition and whether the glass ceiling has been shattered once and
for all?
Unfortunately, this paper answers this question in the negative.

Women are still

underrepresented when it comes to the highest earning positions in Fortune 500 companies.4
The statistical evidence in this paper focuses on the Fortune 500 and large companies because
these entities serve as a guidepost for American corporate culture that are most likely best
equipped with resources to provide opportunities to women.5 Arguably, if gender discrimination
exists in the Fortune 500 and large companies, which generally provide programs to incentivize

1

Yahoo, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Aug. 9, 2012).
Nicole Perlroth, Yahoo Chief Marissa Mayer Welcomes New Baby Boy, N.Y. TIMES, (Oct. 1, 2012),
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/01/yahoo-ceo-marissa-mayer-welcomes-new-baby-boy/
3
Id.
4
Catalyst, 2010 Targeting Inequity: The Gender Gap in U.S. Corporate Leadership, 2, (2012) available
http://www.jec.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?a=Files.Serve&File_id=90f0aade-d9f5-43e7-8501-46bbd1c69bb8.
5
See id. at 2.
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and promote advancement of women, then it is likely that gender discrimination may be
prevalent in smaller business that may not have the resources to provide these incentives.
Although we have made great strides with gender equality since the inception of 1964
Civil Rights Act,6 the current interpretation of Title VII7 still gives insufficient protection for
women in the workplace attempting entry into upper level management. 8 While many scholars
explain the glass ceiling by attributing the lack of women in leadership to personal preferences,9
or the maternal wall,10 this paper proposes that other reasons, such as implicit discrimination,11
may also be keeping certain women from reaching higher positions in corporate America.
Implicit bias12 is prevalent in workplaces,13 as stereotypes have long captured women into certain
traditional gender roles and these perceptions may also be hindering their path up the corporate
ladder.14
Title VII could provide some remedy to the implicit bias problem by raising the
employer’s evidentiary burden in Title VII disparate treatment cases.15 In the proposed solution,
an employer would have to show by clear and convincing evidence, instead of by a
preponderance of the evidence, that an employment decision was not made due to

6

Title VII is legislation that prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, sex, color, religion or
national origin. Title VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1993).
7
Id.
8
See infra Part III.
9
See infra Part II.A.
10
See, e.g., Julie C. Suk, Are Gender Stereotypes Bad for Women? Rethinking Antidiscrimination Law and WorkFamily Conflict, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 14 (2010).
11
See infra Part II.B.1
12
See infra Part II.B.1
13
See Evelyn F. Murphy WITH E.J. Graff, Getting Even, 175 (2005).
14
See infra Part II.B.
15
In disparate treatment cases, Plaintiffs can prove discrimination under Title VII by showing an employment
decision was “tied to a discriminatory animus that an illegitimate factor had a “motivating” or “substantial” role in
the employment decision.” Employers can subsequently defend this claim by providing a legitimate business
reason, by a showing of a preponderance of the evidence. Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509,
522 (3d Cir. 1992).

2

discrimination. Therefore, potentially alleviating the plaintiff from arguing the defendant’s
reason was a pretext if the employer fails to meet the higher burden.16 Another possible solution
presented in this paper is to interpret Title VII to cover implicit bias or workplace bias.

This

proposed cause of action would involve a plaintiff putting forth a case that an employer was
aware of and maintained a gender biased work environment. Unlike a hostile work environment
claim,17 which requires overt actions by employers or management, this claim would attempt to
capture the more subtle aspects of workplace discrimination. In order to claim this under Title
VII, an employer’s work environment would have to impact the plaintiff’s ability to obtain a
promotion or advancement, while a plaintiff would be qualified for advancement and meets
expected performance metrics. For example, an employer could be held liable for promoting
male oriented corporate activities, such as golf, football games, etc or for failure to provide
women with adequate female mentors. Similar to the hostile work environment theory, the
proposed “biased work environment” interpretation would make employers liable for creating
and maintaining a biased work environment or furthering implicit or structural discrimination.
This paper proceeds as follows: Part I introduces and discusses the problem—why more
women are not seated at the helm of Fortune 500 companies, if recent statistics show it may be
better for business.18 Part II will explore why corporate America, which by its nature is the most
prepared of all employers in the nation to address this issue, yet cannot seem to fix the problem.
Part III will discuss the defects in Title VII when it comes to protecting women climbing the

16

Under Ezold, if the employer’s defense is sufficient, the Plaintiff would otherwise have to argue that the
employers justification was a pretext and not really the basis of its policy. Id. at 523
17
A hostile work environment is found when a workplace is both objectively and subjectively offensive, one that a
reasonable person would find abusive. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 141 L.
Ed. 2d 662 (1998).
18
See Gender Diversity & Corporate Performance, CREDIT SUISSE, (2012),
https://infocus.creditsuisse.com/data/_product_documents/_shop/360145/csri_gender_diversity_and_corporate_perf
ormance.pdf; see also Catalyst, supra note 4.
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corporate ladder. Part IV will discuss two proposed solutions. One proposed solution would be
to raise the evidentiary burden of Title VII disparate treatment cases, and another would be to
interpret Title VII to create stronger workplace bias protections. The paper will conclude with a
discussion of each solution and provide a recommendation that would attempt to solve the
problem.
I. Corporate America’s Efforts to Increase Women Leaders
The corporate world is making vast efforts to include women and expand the gender
diversity of their workers.19 A quick website search of some of the companies on the Fortune
500 reveals many incentives for women, such as programs for advancement of women,
providing flexible work hours, or touting of stories of women workers and women leaders.20
Examples of women’s advancement initiatives include programs such as GM’s Women’s Retail
Network, which strives to increase the female presence in the automotive industry. 21 Dow
Chemical’s WIN program, offers women mentoring and networking opportunities.22 To assist
family needs, companies provide flexible schedules such as Bank of America’s compressed
work-weeks, telecommuting and “Flextime.”23 Some, more extreme examples of these types of
initiatives include Sun Microsystems, Inc., which allows almost half of the employees at Sun

19

Female Power, ECONOMIST (Dec. 30 2009), http://www.economist.com/node/15174418
See Id. See also, e.g. GENERAL MOTORS CO., http://www.gmdealerdevelopment.com/wri/index.html (last visited
Oct. 27, 2012); DOW CHEMICAl COMPANY, http://www.dow.com/careers/diversity/environment/woman.htm (last
visited Oct. 27, 2012); BANK OF AMERICA CORP., http://careers.bankofamerica.com/learnmore/flexible_wa.asp (last
visited Oct. 27, 2012).
21
GENERAL MOTORS CO, http://www.gmdealerdevelopment.com/wri/index.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2012).
22
DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY, http://www.dow.com/careers/diversity/environment/woman.htm (last visited Oct. 27,
2012).
23
BANK OF AMERICA CORP, http://careers.bankofamerica.com/learnmore/flexible_wa.asp (last visited Oct. 27,
2012).
20
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Microsystems to work from home and Raytheon, allows workers every other Friday off to take
care of family business.24
A. American Women Struggle Up the Corporate Ladder
Despite these growing corporate women’s initiatives, a report provided by Catalyst Inc., a
nonprofit think-tank organized to promote advancement of women in business, samples the years
1996 to 2009 and depicts the slow rate of progress for women in the Fortune 500.25 “While
women constitute nearly half of the total work force26 and earn 57 percent of Bachelor’s degrees,
60 percent of Masters degrees,27 and control or influence 73 percent of the consumer
decisions28....women make up less than three percent of CEOs and hold roughly 15 percent of
board seats.”29 Although the number of women CEO’s are technically at a record high, given the
weaker historical significance of women leadership in corporate governance, this is not a
miraculous accomplishment. The report further documents that the number of women are still
underrepresented in leadership at the Fortune 500 and these leadership positions decrease the
further up the corporate ladder women ascend.30
Not only are women underrepresented in corporate governance, but there is also evidence
that women are still are paid less than men.

Historical evidence suggests a long-term

discrimination between the salaries of comparable men and women.31 The earnings gap for
women in 2012 is 77 cents on the dollar compared to men according to the most recent U.S.

24

Economist, supra note 19.
Catalyst, supra note 4.
26
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICs, ANNUAL AVERAGES TABLES FROM THE 2009 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY
(2010).
27
NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS (2009).
28
MICHAEL J. SILVERSTEIN ET AL., WOMEN WANT MORE: HOW TO CAPTURE YOUR SHARE OF THE WORLD’S
LARGEST, FASTEST-GROWING MARKET (2009).
29
Catalyst, supra note 4, at 2
30
Id.
31
FRANCINE D. BLAU, MARY C. BRINTON & DAVID B. GRUSKY, DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF GENDER, 113 (2006).
25
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census.32 With respect to corporate America, the Catalyst report suggests that women in Fortune
500 companies still earned less than men, as women tend to start behind and therefore stay
behind, equally qualified men.33 The Catalyst report found that women averaged $4,600 less in
their initial jobs, which because of percentage based raises, result in men’s salary growth
outpacing women’s salary growth.34 Also, when women return to the corporate track after
leaving for motherhood or other reasons, they pay more penalty in position and compensation
compared to men.35
This is not solely an insular concern in corporate America, these statistics are becoming a
broader socioeconomic concern via macroeconomic deskilling.36 Macroeconomic deskilling is
an idea suggesting that the U.S. stands to lose global competitiveness if it continues to expend
resources in educating women, but not utilizing them to their full capacity.37 Women are driven
out of the workforce or into less skilled or advanced jobs due to inflexible workplaces and family
responsibility discrimination.38 The continued deskilling has large impacts on the economy and
could present long-term problems for the U.S. economy competing in a global marketplace.39
B. The Case for Gender Diversity in Corporate Governance
Corporate America may have very compelling reasons to include more women in
leadership positions.

First, there is evidence to suggest that having women in leadership

32

U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE
IN THE UNITED STATES: 2010, available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/p60-239.pdf.
33
Catalyst, supra note 4, at 10.
Id.
35
Id. (“Although women and men step off the corporate track at equal rates, women paid a greater
penalty than men in position and compensation when they return.” ).
36
Joan C. Williams, Jessica Manvell, & Stephanie Bornstien, Opt-Out or Pushed-Out? How the Press Covers
Work/Family Conflict: The Untold Story of Why Women Leave the Workforce, HASTINGS: THE CTR FOR WORK-LIFE
LAW, 43 (2006), http://www.worklifelaw.org/pubs/OptOutPushedOut.pdf
37 Id. see also Women and the World Economy: A guide to Womenomics, ECONOMIST (April 12, 2006).
http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory. cfm?story_id=6802551
38
Id.
39
Id.
34
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positions may help company performance.40 Recent studies provide that companies with more
women in senior roles are positively correlated to better performance and potentially higher
profits.41 Although none of these studies have demonstrated a causal link, companies may
benefit from a more diverse workforce given current metrics.42 The Catalyst report concluded
that “companies with more women board members, on average, significantly outperform those
with fewer women, by 53 percent on Return on Equity, 42 percent on Return on Sales and...66
percent of Return on Invested Capital.”43 A report by Credit Suisse sampled companies in
Europe and the U.S. and discovered that companies with women board members outperformed
those who did not have any women on their board’s in terms of price share performance over the
past six years.44 The Credit Suisse report also reached similar conclusions, as the Catalyst report
stating that on average, return on equity was much higher for companies that had women leaders
than those who did not.45 In addition, the Credit Suisse report found that companies with women
on the board also had increased growth rates at 14%, compared to 10% for companies with only
males on the board.46 A Mckinsey & Co. study found using the McKinsey Organizational Health
Index (“OHI”),47 that companies with three or more women in top positions scored higher than

40

Bryce Covert, Memo to Corporate America: More Women Leaders Means Better Bottom Line, FORBES WOMAN,
(Aug. 1, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/brycecovert/2012/08/01/memo-to-corporate-america-more-womenleaders-means-a-better-bottom-line/
41
Closing the Gap, ECONOMIST (Nov. 26, 2011), www.economist.com/node/21539932
42
Id.
43
Catalyst, supra note 4, at 12.
44
See e.g. Covert, supra note 40; see also Gender Diversity & Corporate Performance, CREDIT SUISSE (Aug.
2012),
https://infocus.creditsuisse.com/data/_product_documents/_shop/360145/csri_gender_diversity_and_corporate_perf
ormance.pdf
45
See Gender Diversity & Corporate Performance, supra note 44 at 18
46
Id. at 14.
47
The OHI measures nine factors, ranging from external orientation to coordination and control, that are linked to
well-functioning organizations. See Joanna Barsh & Lareina Yee, MCKINSEY & CO., UNLOCKING THE FULL
POTENTIAL OF WOMEN IN THE US ECONOMY, (2011) available at
www.mckinsey.com/client_service/organization/latest_thinking/unlocking_the_full_potential.
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their peers, and companies which score higher on the OHI demonstrate superior financial
performance.48
Additionally, corporate America certainly has other strong incentives to advance women
through its ranks to maintain efficiency, increase diversity and improve performance. Corporate
America loses many of its qualified women when they do not reach upper level management. It
is very expensive for companies to spend resources training and developing women without
being able to capitalize this investment, as women do not advance through the ranks or leave the
workforce.49 Arguably, companies should want to retain these women to obtain the benefits of a
broader talent pool, and also reduce costs by improving retention rates. Additionally, gender
diversity may help promote different perspectives, as this may be helpful in innovation or
development of new methods or ideas. Studies show that greater team diversity including gender
diversity can lead to better average performance.50 Also, research suggests that introducing
women in leadership allows for a better balance of leadership skills, as women possess certain
leadership qualities that are beneficial which men generally do not exhibit. Combining both men
and women leaders together would have a beneficial effect of balancing these skills.51 For
example, a study found that women tend to define and communicate responsibilities more clearly
and serve as stronger mentors and coaches to employees.52 Women’s leadership styles focus on
the needs of others, whereas men’s styles are geared towards competition.53 The combination of
these respective gender traits would allow for a better balance of essential leadership qualities
among a group of managers.
48
49
50
51
52
53

Id.
Women and Work, Too Many Suits, ECONOMIST (Nov. 26 2009), http://www.economist.com/node/21539924
Gender Diversity & Corporate Performance, supra note 44, at 18
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Part II. Corporate America and Discrimination Against Women
This section discusses the possible explanations for the glass ceiling, other than
discrimination. Throughout the years, many scholars have argued against the idea of the glass
ceiling and posit that the problem is not a product of the workplace, rather many argue that
women seek not to advance to leadership positions, as women believe family life is more
important or rewarding than having a career or that pregnancy and motherhood deters women
from being able to focus on their careers. Although these are valid arguments, these may not be
the only explanations for the lack of women leaders. The section will subsequently discuss the
possibility of unconscious bias and its role of keeping women from advancing in the workplace.
A. Preference of American Women
Given the publicized statistical evidence showing diversity is good for the bottom line,54
wouldn’t corporations make greater efforts to include women in leadership roles? What could
explain the disparity of women in leadership positions?55 Could this be related to residual
discrimination in corporate America? Numerous scholars argue that discrimination is not the
main reason for these gender gaps between men and women in leadership roles at the Fortune
500. Popularly presented theories in the social sciences suggest reasons, such as the opt-out
revolution56 and maternal wall57 are keeping women from reaching the top spots.
1. The Opt-Out Revolution

54

See supra Part I.B.
See supra Part I.A.
56
Lisa Belkin, The Opt-Out Revolution, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Oct. 26, 2003),
www.nytimes.com/2003/10/26/magazine/26WOMEN.html?pagewanted=all
57
Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family Caregivers Who Are
Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 77, 78 (2003).
55
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One explanation of the wide gender gap in leadership could be due to personal
preferences of women. The “opt-out revolution” a phrase coined by New York Times reporter,
Lisa Belkin, embodies the phenomenon of women’s voluntary choices seeking not to advance
workplace, despite having equal qualifications to men. In her piece, Belkin interviewed women
with education from prestigious universities who had the abilities to advance in their respective
fields, yet chose not to.58 Belkin asserts that females do not necessarily want to become leaders.59
She posits that although women would like to be in these positions, they are not willing to “do
what it takes to get there.”60 She argues that instead of traditional male-oriented forms of
success, like money and power, once heralded as goals by women struggling to “get even” with
men, now women are shifting their own ideas of success to include sanity, balance and work
satisfaction.61 She notes that the shifting goals of approximately 50% of the employee base is
beginning to create a response in employers as well, who are now providing more flexible
schedules and increasing untraditional forms of working to retain their employees.62
Since this article was released there has been plenty of discussion within academic
community of the merits of Belkin’s argument. Critics of the opt-out-revolution find that the
decision of women to voluntarily leave the workforce is more closely related to weaknesses in
the labor market, rather than the opt-out theory.63 Other critics suggest, that the opt-out theory is
a misdiagnosis of the problem, such that women are essentially pushed-out instead of opting-out
because of the demands of the profession.64 Issues like workplace inflexibility, lack of family
58

See Belkin, supra note 56.
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
See Heather Boushey, CTR FOR ECONOMIC AND POL’Y RESEARCH, Are Women Opting Out? Debunking the Myth
9-10, 13 (2005).
64
Id. at 420.
59
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support and workplace bias against mothers seem to be drivers of push-out theory.65 Experts
explain that workforce and workplace mismatch66 is the underlying rational of the push-out
theory, as inflexible schedules and outdated notions of the ideal worker creates macroeconomic
deskilling.67
2. Maternal Wall
Although sometimes argued alongside with opt-out-theory, the mere fact that women
physically give birth is widely accepted explanation for the gender gap in leadership positions in
corporate America.68 Some scholars call this rational the “maternal wall”69 describing when
women reach a motherhood stage, some form of discrimination prevents her from advancing at
work and results in increasing wage gaps between men and women.70 This maternal wall
develops in three points, when a woman gets pregnant, when she becomes a mother, or when she
begins working on a part-time or flexible work arrangement.71 The maternal wall form of
discrimination is premised on the idea that a woman’s responsibilities for her children are
preventing her from being a reliable employee.72 Generally, strong stereotypes of incompetence

65

Id.
See Williams, supra note 36, at 43. see also Boushey, supra note 63, at 13
67
See Williams, supra note 56, see also Boushey, supra note 62, at 13
68
See Priscilla Painton, The Maternal Wall, TIME (May 10, 1993),
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,978472,00.html; see also Nicole Porter, Re-Defining
Superwoman: An Essay on Overcoming the Maternal Wall in the Legal Workplace, 13 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y,
55 (2006).
69
See generally Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family Caregivers Who
Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 77 (2003).
70
Id., See also CENSUS, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2011
(2012).
71
See Williams, supra note 26, at 78.
72
See Claire-Therese D. Luceno, Maternal Wall Discrimination: Evidence Required for Litigation and CostEffective Solutions for A Flexible Workplace, 3 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 157, 159 (2006).
66
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are associated with mothers,73 and therefore the maternal wall is an explanation for mothers’
inability to advance up the corporate ladder.
Although the maternal wall is prevalent argument, there is reason to suggest that this
concept may no longer present major problems for women’s struggle to advance up the ranks at
Fortune 500 companies, as the law appears to have a remedy for this form of discrimination
under the FMLA74, Title VII75 and Equal Pay Act.76 Recently, many mothers or caregivers are
either filing administrative complaints or suing and courts are often finding in their favor.77
Armed with successful precedent, mothers may hold a bargaining chip against employers in the
future, as employers may become more conscious of maternal wall discrimination to avoid these
types of situations.

Despite more favorable litigation results, the maternal wall form of

discrimination is most likely not completely eviscerated from corporate America; however, it
maybe somewhat easier to pinpoint maternal discrimination because of noticeable and evident
issues arising with childcare or birth, which allows the law to develop further remedies as the
need arises.
B. Behind the Scenes Discrimination: Implicit Bias and Structural Problems in the Workplace
Both concepts of the opt-out theory and the maternal wall suggest that women will
always face external difficulties when balancing work and family commitments. However, other
73

See Joan C. Williams, The Social Psychology of Stereotyping: Using Social Science to Litigate Gender
Discrimination Cases and Defang the “Cluelessness” Defense, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 401, 429 (2003)).
74
FAMILY MEDICAL LEAVE ACT 29 U.S.C.A. § 2601 (1993).
75
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (1993).
76
EQUAL PAY ACT OF 1963, §29 U.S.C.A. § 201 (1963).
77
See Joan C. Williams, Elizabeth S. Westfall, Deconstructing the Maternal Wall: Strategies for Vindicating the
Civil Rights of "Careers" in the Workplace, 13 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 31, 32 (2006) (concludes that employers
have significant incentives to avoid maternal wall or caregiver discrimination because of successful litigation under
Title VII or Equal Pay Act); see also Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 731-32 n.5 (2003).
(stereotype that “women's family duties trump those of the workplace” is a “gender stereotype”); Plaetzer v. Borton
Auto., Inc., No. Civ. 02-3089 JRT/JSM, 2004 WL 2066770, at 6 (D. Minn. Aug. 13, 2004) (holding that “where an
employer's objection to an employee's parental duties is actually a veiled assertion that mothers, because they are
women, are insufficiently devoted to work, or that work and motherhood are incompatible, such treatment is gender
based and is properly addressed under Title VII.”).
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forms of discrimination that are inherent due to general social stereotypes may be even more
harmful to women as a whole than more salient forms of discrimination.

While overt

discrimination will keep women from advancing up the corporate ladder because of external
pressures or decisions by employers, implicit discrimination78 or unconscious bias79 could keep
women from wanting to advance altogether. Social awareness of implicit bias can remove the
thought of women seeing themselves achieving corner office status. In other words, implicit
discrimination nips women’s ambitions in the bud and prevents women from trying achieve top
positions in the first place, keeping great proportion of women far from potential executive talent
pools altogether. Unlike opt-out theory, which Belkin proposes that women leave to obtain goals
such as balance and sanity, structural discrimination80 or workplace bias81 may be one of the
factors serving as an impetus for women to take the “mommy track”82 or leave to raise a family,
as they anticipate their efforts may be more efficient, worthwhile or productive in areas other
than the workplace due to their awareness of implicit bias in certain work environments.
1. Scholars Explain the Phenomenon of Unconscious Bias
Social science suggests that implicit or unconscious bias in the workplace remains
widespread, but this bias goes undetected as it lies within thoughts and is not visible on paper or
more outspoken forms.83 Empirical research developed by Anthony Greenwald and Mahzarin

78

Implicit Association Test, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/demo/background/index.jsp (last visited Nov. 1,
2012). See generally, Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, "Science," and Antidiscrimination Law, 1 HARV. L. &
POL'Y REV., 477 (2007).
79
See Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV.
458, 460 (2001), See also, Tristin K. Green, A Structural Approach As Antidiscrimination Mandate: Locating
Employer Wrong, 60 VAND. L. REV. 849, 854 (2007).
80
See infra Part II.
81
Id.
82
Rachel Emma Silverman, Is the Mommy Track Still Taboo, WALL ST. J. (May 27, 2011, 11:21pm),
http://blogs.wsj.com/juggle/2011/03/27/is-the-mommy-track-still-taboo/.
83
See e.g., Tristin K. Green, A Structural Approach As Antidiscrimination Mandate: Locating Employer Wrong, 60
VAND. L. REV. 849, 854 (2007), see also Jessica L. Martens, Thinking Outside the Big Box: Applying A Structural
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Bajaji suggests a substantial disassociation between explicit and internal attitudes through the
implicit associations test (“IAT”).84 The implicit association test generally states that internal
attitudes and biases turn into actual behavior in the workplace.

85

Another study by Dr. Martha

Foshi, revealed a double standard existed with perceived competence of men and women,
involving the same tasks.86

Scholars provide the term “structural discrimination,” which

embodies organizational behavior related to implicit bias.87 Structural discrimination theorist
suggests that this type of discrimination is not a problem of isolated work decisions, but causes a
bias in the workplace environments on a day-to-day basis.88 Professor Tristin Green elaborates
the findings of unconscious bias and the implicit association test:
A correlation between scores on implicit attitude tests and behavior toward group
members, suggest that these biases actually do translate into behavior....In one
recent study, researchers responded to over 1300 help-wanted advertisements with
sets of four fictitious resumes. Each resume was randomly assigned an African
American-sounding name (e.g., Jamal or Lakisha) or a white-sounding name (e.g.,
Greg or Emily), and each set of four resumes included two higher-qualified
applicants and two lesser-qualified applicants. The white-sounding names
received fifty percent more callbacks than the African American-sounding names,
and while the better resume assisted white-sounding names by thirty percent, the
better resume only minimally assisted African American-sounding names.89
These implicit or structural biases also applies to men and women, as employers may associate
women with presupposed notions of how they are supposed to act, rather than how they actually

Theory of Discrimination to Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Dukes (131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011)), 51 WASHBURN L.J. 411, 418
(2012); Ann C. McGinley, Discrimination Redefined, 75 MO. L. REV. 443, 450 (2010).
84
Implicit Association Test, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/demo/background/index.jsp (last visited Nov. 1,
2012).
85
See Green, supra note 83, at 855.
86
See Martha Foschi, Double Standards in the Evaluation of Men and Women, 59 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 237 (Sept.
1996).
87
Id. at 857.
88
Id, 857. see also Williams, supra note 73, at 416; Janet K. Swim & Lawrence J. Sana, He’s Skilled, She’s Lucky:
A Meta-Analysis of Observers’ Attributions for Women’s and Men’s Successes and Failures, 22 PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHO. BULL. 507 (1996).
89
See Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward A Structural Account of Disparate
Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 109-10 (2003).
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act in the workplace.90 For example, some of these biases include different internal associations
for actions by men and women respectively. Studies suggest that male social behavior would be
regarded as mentoring, rainmaking or negotiating a business deal, whereas similar behavior in
women is interpreted as frivolous, non-work related sociability such as gossip.91

Another

example of an internal association was found when an employee took time to make a decision.
The study showed an association that a man “really think things through” whereas the woman
was thought to be too hesitant.92
Adding to the framework of the structural discrimination argument, social science
suggests that women have more work environment barriers to success when compared to men.
A Mckinsey & Co. study revealed that women perceive advancing in organizations as arduous
because of workplace environment reasons such as the lack of role models, exclusion from
informal networks and not having sponsors in upper management to create opportunities.93
2. Gender Biased Workplaces or Discrimination Not Captured by Title VII: Practical
Examples & Case Law
Although implicit discrimination or structural discrimination may be present throughout
corporate America, plaintiffs have a difficult time bringing a Title VII claim for these forms of
discrimination.94

As we have seen in prior case law, successful Title VII with respect to

disparate impact claims are often found when discrimination is obvious.95 Dukes v. Wal-Mart
provides a clear example of an entire corporate culture overtly biased against women. Although
90
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Wal-Mart was successful in defending a class action certification claim in U.S. Supreme Court
and the case was never argued substantively, Lisa Featherstone, in her book Selling Women
Short, provides that evidence of sex-bias in its corporate culture was apparent throughout the
discovery process.96 Featherstone’s book is wrought with examples of gender discrimination,
with personal tales of women’s plight to reach management. Featherstone interviewed many
Wal-mart employees, which all had similar stories of pervasive gender discrimination. One
specific plaintiff, Christine Kwapnoski faced comments from mangers such as “doll-up” and
“dust the cobwebs off” [her makeup] and was told she had to have certain requirements prior to
promotions, which males were never subject to.97 Moreover, Wal-mart’s percentage of women
in management was significantly behind their competitors.98 Although, Wal-mart posited that it
had a significant amount of women in management when including their “department
managers,” these positions were paid hourly, unlike the male dominated manager roles that were
salaried positions.99 Featherstone argues that few companies would define an hourly worker as
a “manager,” additionally these “managers” are significantly paid less than salaried managers.100
The Wal-mart department managers do not have “managerial-like” responsibilities as they
cannot terminate employees or give raises.101 Department managers make significantly less than
other managers, for example, a woman working as an hourly department manager makes on
average $21,709 a year, whereas an assistant manager, the lowest level of salaried management,
makes on average $37,322.102 Essentially, Wal-Mart was justifying its numbers of male-female
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ratio goals by relying on positions that were clearly not similar to traditional management
positions.
Apart from clear cases with substantial direct evidence of sex discrimination, structural
bias is more difficult to locate within the Title VII context. Some case law suggests that
structural bias may be apparent; however, without proper legal framework for these types of
claims, it is unlikely that litigators would advance any cases without direct evidence or very
strong circumstantial evidence. An example of potential structural bias claims could be found in
cases such as, Brooks v. Ashtabula County Welfare Dept., where plaintiff’s Title VII claim was
dismissed, as a director’s allegation of her “ill-temper” was sufficient to describe why plaintiff
was not promoted, despite repeated recommendations by her direct supervisor. 103 The
employment decision in Brooks was based on a director’s sole belief of Brook’s temperament.104
The director did not promote Brooks because he believed her attitude was “abrasive and
judgmental” “she had a propensity to make arbitrary moral judgments and she aggravated coworkers and other professionals her job brought her contact into.105 He also believed she
donned a “superior attitude” towards clerical workers.106 However, nothing of this attitude was
noted in her personnel file, in fact, her file contained a favorable recommendation from her direct
supervisor. The evidence of her bad attitude was based on the sole director’s testimony, and the
court held this to be sufficient by a preponderance of the evidence. While the court may have
found some evidence of non-discriminatory motives for the employment decision in this case,
the facts presented could seriously indicate some forms implicit or unconscious bias on behalf of
the director in his unilateral subjective decision not to promote Brooks.
103
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Another example of potential structural bias could be found in Reilly v. Califano, where
plaintiff did not survive a Title VII claim, because of the employer’s belief that plaintiff was too
shy and not assertive was sufficient to rebut a prima facie claim. 107 He believed that she did not
“possess the sort of personality and demeanor necessary for the position.”108 Again, in this case,
it is possible for the hiring manager to have implicit bias when making a decision, yet the court
gave deference to the employer’s subjective justification of Reilly’s shy personality.
Additional examples of these subjective biases with personality traits could bee seen in
Kelner v. Green Refractories, where the supervisor believed “her attitude, loud and aggressive
nature was sufficient to rebut a prima facie Title VII claim.109 In this case, the plaintiff was even
more qualified than the competition, yet she did not obtain a promotion due her supervisor’s
subjective belief of her “attitude.”110 Metzsh v. Avaya, Inc., is another example of potential
subjective bias in employment decisions, as in this case, plaintiff’s bad attitude with respect to
certain assignments was held sufficient to rebut a prima facie claim of discrimination.111 In cases
such as Reily, Brooks, Kelner and Metzch where plaintiffs’ personalities and not qualifications
are the deciding factors of litigation may be largely influenced by structural discrimination, yet
given some these results, Title VII fails to capture some forms of unconscious or implicit
discrimination.
III. Title VII and Structural Discrimination
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Plaintiffs have various methods of pursuing violations under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964112 for gender discrimination in the workplace. A string of United States Supreme
Court cases has developed over time to include various interpretations of sexual discrimination
within Title VII.113 There are two basic legal theories that are helpful for women in gender
discrimination claims in the workplace with respect to glass ceiling issues: disparate treatment
and disparate impact.114
Disparate treatment includes “pretext,” “mixed motive” and “hostile work environment”
claims.115 To succeed in a “pretext” case courts generally require a three-step process, as
provided in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. The woman must first prove a prima facie case
by showing that she is a member of a protected class, she must be qualified for the position, and
was rejected by her employer.116

Then the burden shifts to the Defendant to offer a

nondiscriminatory reason for the decision.117 If the Defendant offers a sufficient reason, the
burden shifts back to the employee to prove the Defendant’s reason is pretext for sex
discrimination.118 Mixed-motive cases require impermissible criteria that were a substantial or
motivating factor for an employment decision. 119 Hostile work environment claims are another
subset of disparate treatment theory, which requires that women be exposed to workplace with
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overt discrimination, intimidation, ridicule and insult, and that employer was aware, yet failed to
prevent discriminatory conduct in the workplace.120
Another major legal theory under Title VII includes “disparate impact” claims, which
allow plaintiffs to challenge employment practices that appear to be neutral, but have a harmful
impact on a protected group. 121 In order to establish a claim under this interpretation, a plaintiff
needs to demonstrate that an employer’s facially neutral practice or plan operates in a
discriminatory pattern.122 Once this is shown, and employer must rebut plaintiffs claim by
justifying that its practice or standards have a manifest relation to employment. 123

If the

employer is able to prove this defense, the plaintiff can still argue that the practice is a pretext.124
A. Disparate Treatment: Burden on the Defendant
The problem with glass ceiling cases and the disparate treatment arguments under Title
VII is that generally, the higher one ascends within an organization, the more subjective
employment decisions may become; therefore the risk of structural or implicit bias may become
highly associated to employment decisions.125

One main disadvantage with the disparate

treatment analysis under the current U.S. Supreme Court interpretation is that the burden of proof
for employers is very easy to overcome with respect to rebutting a prima facie showing of
discrimination. The burden of production for defending disparate treatment cases is still under
discussion and has been disputed prior to the Hopkins case.126 In Hopkins, the U.S. Supreme
Court refused to adopt a clear & convincing standard for the defendant’s response to a prima
120
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facie case by only requiring a preponderance of the evidence standard.127 Subsequently, the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 (“CRA”) altered the Hopkins standard and offered an easier
“motivating-factor” method, which allows plaintiff to prevail, even though the discrimination is
not the but for cause of the adverse decision.128 Although the burden is somewhat more favorable
for plaintiffs, a preponderance of the evidence standard may still be insufficient in light of the
unconscious bias that may be involved in decision-making processes.
When unconscious bias is at play, its is very difficult to determine whether it has taken
place. An employer can arguably set forth any reason for its action, so long as it is rational and
sounds convincing.

As hiring decisions in upper management may be very subjective,129

employers are easily able to defend a prima facie claim by providing a legitimate reason, yet still
retain bias at the same time. For example, in Ezold v. Wolf Block, Schoor & Solis, an attorney
(Ezold) was able to provide a prima facie case of discrimination, but because the employer
provided a defense that the attorney lacked analytical ability (even though there was evidence
that her intellectual growth was stymied by structural bias in her given assignments) the court
held employers defense sufficient.

The court assumed that employer’s decision into her

assignments were not caused by discrimination and gave strong deference to the employer with
respect to its decision not to give Ezold more complex assignments. One explanation of the
employer’s decision could be related to implicit bias against her abilities as a female, yet this was
not considered by the Court.
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Other case law prior to the Civil Right Act of 1991 evidences

the entry of structural discrimination. In earlier cases, so long as employers created a rational
business reason for the seemingly discriminatory acts, the court would not uphold a disparate
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treatment claim, even though implicit discrimination could be a motivating factor for an
employment decision. 131
B. Arguing Disparate Impact
Disparate impact132 theory is also not an effective method for a glass-ceiling claimant. Initially a
claimant could probably easily make a prima facie showing on a disparate impact claim, as this
theory is based on facially neutral practices and do not require proof of motive or intent of
discrimination by employers.133 Given the statistics of few women in management positions,134
theoretically a female plaintiff would probably be able to obtain evidence showing some form of
disparate impact of an employer’s hiring practices, if she can provide statistical evidence.135
However, these statistics may be hard to compare, as employment decisions are made on an
individualized basis.136 Moreover, disparate impact necessitates a showing that a “particular
employment practice” has a disparate impact on a protected group, or if an employer’s selection
process has a disparate impact and the components of that process cannot be separated by
analysis.137 Thus, a glass-ceiling plaintiff would have to identify a specific practice that is
impacting her group.138 This may, in application, prove very difficult if the employment practice
or barrier is implicit or subjective internal decision made by hiring managers that is not based on
a company-wide policy. Unfortunately, there are also statutory exemptions that make disparate
131
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impact claims unappetizing for a glass-ceiling claimant, such as the lack of jury trials, limited
remedies, and exemptions for seniority or merit systems.139
Additionally, under this theory employers can also easily defend disparate impact claims,
as current black letter law states that employer’s burden to show the practice has a “manifest
relation to the employment,”140 as opposed to the more stringent requirement of “bonefide
occupational quality,”141 which only applies when a policy is facially discriminatory.142 A
manifest relation to employment has generally been interpreted to mean that the actions are
based on legitimate business reasons, but historically courts have had an ambiguous
interpretation to this defense.

143

The Wards Cove opinion is a U.S. Supreme Court case that

attempted to elaborate the interpretation of the employer’s defense. The majority adopted a
business necessity standard stating that the challenged practice did not need to be essential or
indispensible to employer’s interest but it must serve the employers legitimate employment
goals.

144

The Wards Cove opinion also was somewhat ambiguous with respect to burden of

production and persuasion for the employer.

145

The Civil Rights Act of 1991 helped clarify the

ambiguity after Wards Cove, as the statute provides that an employer bears both burdens of
production and persuasion when providing a defense for a prima facie disparate impact claim.146
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 reiterates that a defending party must prove a business necessity
after a showing of disparate impact; however, if the defending party can prove that the
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employment practice does not cause the disparate impact, it does not need to show a business
necessity defense.147 This would probably be a common pitfall the glass-ceiling plaintiff, who
cannot identify a specific employment practices that results in a disparate impact.

Thus,

rendering this theory problematic for the unconscious and subjective aspects of her claim.
C. Title VII: Disparate Treatment & Disparate Impact Claims
Title VII disparate treatment claims are not sufficient to capture the structural and
implicit discrimination that social science has determined is exists in the workplace.148 Prior to
Hopkins, courts have conceded that subjective decision making could lead to influences of bias
and discrimination that are unconscious and even conscious, but are difficult to trace during
litigation and are not sufficient to counter an employer’s justifications.149 Although the court in
Hopkins, found discrimination through a disparate treatment claim, the actions were so obvert, a
situation like this would be difficult to find at this point in time.
Some cases support that plaintiffs are failing to make prima facie case even though facts
suggest that implicit bias is a motivating factor for an employment decision.

For example, in

Infante v. Ambac, there was considerable evidence that a woman’s motherhood was taken into
consideration during the interview process. The employer asked questions like: “How does this
fit into the mix of you now being a mother of two living in New Jersey, is this really what you
want to do? How does that fit into the mix?....She was also asked “with [your] situation now, do
[you] want to come back to Ambac, do [you] really want to come back, is this what [you] want?
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The employer proceeded to hire a male after the plaintiff’s interview, yet the court found that the
plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case of discrimination.150
Moreover, scholars argue Title VII is no longer viable as a remedy for structural
discrimination, as corporations or employers tend to create “sham” internal processes that do not
really battle structural bias, these practices are merely reactions to potential litigation and do not
really solve the foundational problems. 151 Thus, neither disparate treatment, nor disparate impact
claims can capture implicit bias and they do not “examine or directly encourage revision of the
intra-organizational culture and decision processes that entrench bias, stereotyping, and unequal
access.”152

This line of reasoning suggests that current Title VII remedies are no longer

sufficient to address the underlying issues within structural bias and are calling for other
alternatives, such as Sturm’s arguments for a new regulatory approach, or Tristin Green who
suggests a revamping disparate treatment claims under a structural approach for
discrimination.153
IV. Solution: Proposals
Implicit bias has proven to be a difficult task to litigate, as without physical or conscious
evidence of discrimination, it would be nearly impossible for a plaintiff to bring forth sufficient
evidence of unconscious discrimination.154

Apart from completely rewriting Title VII or

creating a regulatory system to capture implicit discrimination some smaller changes can be done
which would assist in protecting women from unconscious bias in the workplace.
A. An Alternate Interpretation: Disparate Treatment

150

See Infante v. Ambac Fin. Group, 03 CV 8880 (KMW), 2006 WL 44172 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2006) aff'd, 25.
See Sturm, supra note 79, at 467-68.
152
Id. at 490.
153
See Sturm and Green, supra note 66.
154
See Tolson, supra note 143 at 350.
151

25

Although disparate impact theory provides less burden in that it does not require evidence
of discriminatory intent, modifying the disparate impact theory to include glass ceiling type suits
could bring seriously threat to the competing interest of employers rights to its professional
judgments courts have always protected.155 One potential alteration to Title VII would be to
raise the employers’ burden of persuasion when providing a response to a prima facie disparate
treatment claim to a clear and convincing standard. Although a preponderance of the evidence
standard is generally used in Title VII cases,156 the burden of persuasion should be lifted for
disparate treatment type of cases because discrimination can be so subtle and employers may
more easily evade structural or implicit bias issues with a preponderance of the evidence
standard. Although lifting the standard will not completely eviscerate unconscious bias because
implicit bias is difficult to pinpoint, having an employer prove a business necessity defense
under a higher standard may help weed out unconscious discrimination problems by requiring
more concrete evidence of legitimate business reasons from an employer. The higher standard
may also prompt employers to be more careful about the potential of employment discrimination
and ensure that supervisors are aware of the dangers of unconscious bias in the workplace.
Although some may claim that this would entice frivolous lawsuits, placing a higher burden on
the defendant would not detract from the fact that plaintiffs would have to still prove a prima
facie case and still provide a safeguard from meritless suits.
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B. Biased Work Environment Claim
Another more radical alternative would be to provide an added framework argument for a
Title VII, which would provide for relief for those who challenge discrimination due to a “biased
work environment” claim under a disparate treatment theory. The claim would act similar to a
hostile work environment157 claim, in that it would be actionable based on an objective and
subjective standard. While a hostile work environment deals with sexual harassment and abusive
work environment issues, the biased work environment claim would be another cause of action
attempting to control a gender biased work environments. The proposed claim would have very
limited parameters and a plaintiff would have to casually connect the biased environment to
some type of negative employment decision in order to prevent frivolous litigation. Essentially,
the goal for this proposed biased work environment claim would attempt to encourage employers
to consider implicit bias with respect to the work environment it creates and would hold
employers liable for furthering or creating a biased work environments.
A biased work environment cause of action would include aspects of structural
discrimination such as informal policies that may inhibit employees from advancing,158 such as
maintaining “old boy”159 networks or disparate availability of mentorship opportunities.160
Male-oriented or dominated networking activities still reign in corporate America. 161 These
environments may prevent women from socializing and creating valuable networks, which are
useful in advancing to the top.
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Some examples of these types of claims could include
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employers being aware of or promoting informal networking events for male-dominated or
oriented activities. Although the event may not have excluded women facially, the nature of the
activity precluded women from attending due to sex-based stereotypes, which may have made
them feel uncomfortable in attending (such as golf outings, fantasy football, nightclubs). Other
examples would include showing stigmatization for working from home, even though employers
maintain a telecommuting policy or if an employer failed to assist women employees in finding
suitable women mentors.
While litigating this type of claim may have some practical limits, as many of these
scenarios are difficult to prove in the context of litigation, the proposed claim would be more
useful as a warning to corporations. The fact that a plaintiff would be enabled to bring this type
of claim could cause some corporations to reconsider their work environments and create
systems to solve the problem rather than seeking prevent litigation. Critics of this type of claim
would suggest that government is intruding upon the employer’s autonomy and their rights in
management of the workplace. This would be a policy question, that legislature would have to
balance the importance of an avenue structural discrimination claims against employers’
autonomy.
Part V: Conclusion
Part of the difficulties of Title VII disparate impact claims and unconscious
discrimination could be related to courts strong adherence to the doctrine employment at-will.163
The reasoning underlying this connection is that if employers are able to terminate employees at
will, their promotion decisions should also be allowed great deference. Although a violation of
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the Civil Rights Act works like an exception to the at-will doctrine,164 courts may still adhere to
policy reasons for upholding an at-will mentality, especially when discrimination may not be
obvious. The Supreme Court in Hopkins and Civil Rights Act of 1991 decisions not to lift
employers burden of persuasion of a legitimate business interest to clear and convincing
standard165 may be partially due to the notion of common law at-will contracts that reiterate the
long-held beliefs that employers are entitled to deference when they make employment
decisions.
Some scholars argue that strengthening Title VII claims does nothing more than create
inefficiencies and does not address the underlying problem.166 Many argue that employers will
respond to threat of Title VII liability by over-investing in measures that will not likely reduce
implicit bias.167 However, if we were to create a claim under Title VII that specifically forces
employers to consider unconscious bias or structural discrimination when creating a work
environment, this would help avoid the issues of “sham” internal processes.

168

The proposed

workplace bias claim could have a result in encouraging employers to rethink how they structure
their workplaces and create a more gender diverse work environments.

Although corporate

America is well on its way to addressing some of these issues, it seems that more needs to be
done given the current statistics of women leaders. A new Title VII claim could help nudge
companies who talk-the-talk, but do not walk-the-walk when it comes to providing equal
opportunities for its women leaders.
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